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Innovating ‘Innovation’, Competing ‘Competitiveness’: 
A Critical Political Economy Approach to  
Social Innovation System* 
 
Bonn Juegoβ 
 
 
Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, 
electric telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc. 
These are products of human industry; 
natural material transformed into 
organs of the human will over nature, 
or of human participation in nature. 
They are organs of the human brain, 
created by the human hand; 
the power of knowledge, objectified. 
— Karl Marx (1858) 
 
 
Introduction 
The neo-liberal offensive that has systematically unleashed its forces since the 
global economic crisis of the 1970s is further deepening not only the digital 
divide but the social divisions as well.  It is done ot anymore in the old 
imperialist fashion of the rich robbing the poor. All is done is to subject and 
subordinate the poor countries and labour to the imperatives of the market. This 
is therefore the moment when a more dynamic, socially embedded alternative to 
development that focuses on production and innovatin as drivers of economic 
growth is most urgently needed. 
 
This essay proposes a critical political economy approach to social innovation 
system that critiques the disembedding of the market f om the society, on the 
one hand, and that attempts to offer an alternative through a progressive project 
of re-embedding the market forces in the society, on the other. It does so in four 
(4) inter-related sections. First, it lays down initial propositions for ‘a critical 
political economy approach to social innovation system’. This proposed 
approach improvises from the established national inovation system (NIS) 
approach of the Freeman-Lundvall-Nelson persuasion, with emphasis on the 
                                                      
*   Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Asia-Europe Institute, University of 
Malaya, Kuala Lumpur in June 2005 and at the Globelics Academy Ph.D. School on 
Innovation and Economic Development, Lisbon, Portugal, 1-12 May 2007. The author is 
grateful to his classmates and the lecturers in these vents and institutions for their 
invaluable discussion and comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
β  Bonn Juego is PhD Fellow in Global Development Studies at Aalborg University, 
Denmark. 
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developmental needs of the developing countries and the indispensable role of 
the workers. Second, it tries to unpack the logic of innovation against the 
background of the contradictions of market-dependence under conditions of 
globalisation. It provides a case for the combined and uneven character of 
development under the global capitalist system with the intensification of the 
ICT revolution, specifically the progressive potential of technological 
innovation that is regressively constrained by its dependence on the market. It 
reveals the wounds of modernity—the widening social d visions and increasing 
poverty—that are just sealed, and not healed, by the tremendous productive 
capability of innovation. Third, it attempts to unpack the project of 
competitiveness being pressed on national economies around the world by the 
multilateral, international, and regional institutions, and is being implemented by 
states. It argues that the recent competitiveness project being globally promoted 
is for capitalist market competition. Finally, it concludes with the significance of 
a critical political economy perspective towards a ocial innovation system. It 
then recommends further enquiry worthwhile as an intellectual endeavour and 
for policy-making, and hints at some prospects for advancing change towards 
the realisation of real, sustainable development. 
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A Critical Political Economy Approach to National Innovation System 
I propose here a ‘critical political economy approach to social innovation 
system’ that would serve both as an intellectual filter in understanding the 
dynamics of a social innovation system against the background of the historical 
evolution of global capitalism and as a tr nsformative framework in orienting 
opposition to the hegemony of neo-liberalism and in promoting development 
strategies in the developing world. This critical political economy perspective 
would reveal the limitations and contradictions of innovation as promoted within 
the faith on global competitiveness, and thereby makes it possible to identify 
points of weakness which the proponents of alternative futures can exploit. 
 
This proposed critical political economy perspective puts forward six 
fundamental theses for discussing the dynamics of innovation. First, it sees the 
history of technological development as closely bounded with the evolution of 
global capitalism. This suggests that technology is not only path-dependent, but 
is strongly shaped—but not uniquely determined—by the existing structure as 
well, in particular the capitalist structure. It therefore adopts Carlota Perez’s 
(2002) reinvention of the Schumpeterian analysis of the changing relationship 
between technological advances and financial capital that shapes the pattern of 
economic cycles. Apart from this highly interactive and direct relationship 
between technological revolution and finance capital, the model suggests the 
existence of remarkable dynamic regularities and recur nt sequences of change 
in the capitalist system. It starts from the propositi n that at the irruption of a 
technological revolution, configured in a particular techno-economic paradigm, 
all existing industries and activities are modernised. The process of diffusion of 
this historical moment across the economy constitutes a great surge of 
development. Each surge that approximately lasts for a half century has two 
distinct periods (namely, the installation period and the deployment period), 
which are mediated by a turning point. Each of these periods in recurring 
sequence then undergoes four phases (with each phase lasting around a decade): 
irruption – frenzy – turning point – synergy and maturity. As a result, this 
massive economic transformation involves complex processes of social 
assimilation which may also require the adaptation of socio-institutional 
framework to each paradigm, and the eventual need for a process of 
‘institutional creative destruction’ for the introduction and diffusion of the next 
technological revolution (see Perez 2002). Within tis broad model, it must be 
noted that the critical political economy approach proposed here does not 
embrace technological determinism, but sees the historical specificity of 
technological revolutions represented in distinct ‘techno-economic paradigms’ 
as a product of the interaction among technology, politics, society and culture 
leading to certain economic pattern.   
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Second, today’s historical moment is best characterised as the ‘universalisation 
of capitalism’ in which the logics of accumulation, competition, 
commodification, and profit-maximisation have penetrated to the depths of 
human life, nature, and all social relations (Wood 1997). This also means the 
universalisation of the contradictions inherent in the capitalist system, in 
particular the cumulative yet uneven character of development under global 
capitalism.  As a result of this phenomenon of combined and uneven 
development, societies in the world develop at an uneven pace resulting in the 
coexistence of both primitive and advance features of the society across and 
within nations. These varying domestic configurations suggest that it may give 
rise to distinct arrays of interests and distinct strategies for technological 
development from society to society in the world. 
 
Third, all capitalist social relations—including the processes of innovation, 
production, appropriation and distribution—are ‘mediated at all points by 
exchange’ (that is, by the market).  This dependence on the market is one of 
capitalism’s fundamental contradictions.1 Capital, labour, and technology—
individually or in relation to one another—are depend nt on the market. Their 
market-dependent nature is a fundamental condition of survival and social 
reproduction, on which it imposes its imperatives of competition and profit-
maximisation (Wood 2001: 275-93).  There is a dependent relationship between 
capital and labour; but this relationship is reinforced by the market, guaranteeing 
a structure of the real subsumption of labour to capital. Workers find themselves 
in a labour situation thoroughly permeated by market imperatives. Capital, on 
the other hand, needs to compete with one another for profitability and, 
arguably, often leads to the preservation of lower labour cost. Further, under 
conditions of contemporary global capitalism, as depict d in the process of 
globalisation, innovation is now systematically seen as a process of perpetual 
technological development that is constitutive of the market.  
 
Fourth, this process of the disembedding of the market from the society is a 
central logic of the capitalist system that makes it a unique system of 
appropriation, which is very much private but one that does not carry any public 
responsibility. This suggests a two-fold contradiction in capitalism of the 
systematic separation between ‘the economic’ and ‘the political’. On the one 
hand, its conduct of business is a social relation hat implicates the whole of 
                                                      
1  Ellen Meiksins Wood (2001) however argues that this ‘market dependence’ is ‘the 
fundamental contradiction’ in capitalism that is not present in any other social systems 
like feudalism and socialism. Hence, this argument implies that it is not ‘class struggle’ 
which is the fundamental contradiction of capitalism, as is conventionally understood by 
many of the system’s critics. For her, class struggle is only constitutive of the 
contradictions of market dependence. ‘Contradictions’ here refer to the system’s internal 
logic (i.e., the capitalist market), to the system’s dependence on its own structural 
relationships that produce conflict and incoherence, problems and vulnerabilities.    
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society.   But at the same time, public institutions exist apart from private 
appropriation and are mobilised to sustain this system of private property that 
carries no public responsibilities (Wood 2001). 
 
Fifth, there is therefore a need to re-embed in and subordinate the market forces 
to the society that now controls the world towards putting an end to uneven 
development and the realisation of real development, a qualitative improvement 
to the lives of all.  The governance of innovation, a d technology as its material 
manifestation, is key to this task of re-embedding the market forces in the 
society as the development of the material forces of pr duction brings about 
social change. However, the ongoing ‘great transformation’ of pre-capitalist 
social forms into a capitalist market economy that is increasingly leading to the 
disembedding of the market from the society (Polanyi 1978) has likewise 
transformed innovation from a social endeavour to aask to be satisfied by the 
market forces. 
 
Sixth, this task of governance of the market and of innovation by the society 
would be best accomplished through a social innovation system, the existence of 
institutional synergies necessary for a socially emb dded innovative activities 
and economic development. This improvises on the Nation l Innovation 
Systems pioneered by Christopher Freeman and later Bengt-Åke Lundvall 
(1992) and Richard Nelson (1993) in a way that stres es the ‘social’ in 
innovation systems—that innovation is a social endeavour that implicates the 
society. It incorporates all actors in the society—he state/government, firms, 
supporting institutions domestically and abroad, and the people themselves—in 
the process of innovation. And significantly, it requires the extension of the 
long-established ‘triple helix’ model of states, firms, and universities in 
understanding the dynamics of innovation to introduce an indispensable set of 
actors: workers. As Marx (1858) puts it in his understanding of technology, as 
opposed to nature, as central to social production and development:  
 
Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-
acting mules etc. These are products of human industry; natural material 
transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human 
participation in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the 
human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified. (p. 706) 
 
Unfortunately, this ‘tacit’ understanding has been marginalised in most 
literatures on technology, innovation, and development today and thereby 
systematically excluding the workers without whom innovation cannot be 
realised.  
 
Hence, as an analytical tool, the critical political economy approach to social 
innovation system does not only deal with relations f exchange that merely sees 
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the surface appearance of phenomena as in the ‘classical’ political economy 
school; critical political economy focuses on class relations among human 
beings and of their underlying causes. The critical political economy perspective 
deals with issues of class and power inherent in the history and dynamics of 
innovation. It thus brings the ‘social’ back in the analysis of innovation, that is 
the idea that interdependent actors cumulatively inf ue ce, affect, and implicate 
each other in their shared space called the society (for an interesting historical 
account on the works of Antonio Serra alluding to these concepts of increasing 
returns and cumulative causations on economic development, see Reinert and 
Reinert [2003]). As a transformative tool, it raises the consciousness of all the 
actors in the society of the nature of the social emb ddedness of innovation. It 
promotes the nurturing of wisdom, of care and concern and a high sense of 
responsibility for the society, alongside knowledge generation and creation in a 
learning economy. For the developing world, this would mean the resistance 
against the hegemony of neo-liberalism that promotes d epening capital 
accumulation, rather than of the ‘assimilation’ of development strategies, 
alongside the building of local technological capabilities.   
     
Rising from the abstract to the concrete, the next sections deal with the 
hegemonic discourses on innovation and competitiveness under conditions of 
capitalism in contemporary political economy.    
 
 
The Market-Dependent and Socially Disembedded Nature of Innovation 
under Capitalism 
The progressive potentials of technological innovati n in creating growth and 
wealth for humanity are well known. Today’s techno-economic paradigm is 
characterised by the intensification of ICT, which offers ‘tremendous potential’ 
and ‘great promise to raise new growth opportunities as well as bring greater 
equity’ (see Rasiah and Oyeyinka 2004: 2).  This ICT-led development potential 
has however become an empty force and an empty promise amidst the growing 
national inequalities and poverty around the world (see Singh and Dhumale 
2000). With the advent of the 21st century which is characteristic of the 
maturation of the ICT as the contemporary techno-economic paradigm since 
1971, it is believed that the ‘new economy’ has the capability for generating 
sustained growth. This popular belief was formed by the globalisation of the two 
dominant discourses at that historical juncture: (i) the foreseen perpetual 
increases of productivity due to the promises of the information revolution and, 
(ii) the faith in the financial markets in unleashing the capitalist ethos for wealth 
generation. The collapse of the Internet bubble has however frustrated many of 
the then optimistic spectators of the rise of information revolution and finance 
capital. As Perez (2002) argues this kind of euphoria b ought about by the 
excitement in new technology and in financial mania i  the global economy, 
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eventually leading to a recession, is nothing unpreced nted. The history of 
technological revolutions, which is inescapably linked with the power of finance 
capital, is one of continuity of the nature and logic of the capitalist system, of 
recurrence of its historical structure. Thus, what remains unchanged since the 
industrial revolution in the 18th century is the long held capitalist principles of 
letting the market forces be the sole director of the fate of human lives.     
  
The current techno-economic paradigm is reinforcing the combined and uneven 
character of development under global capitalism. In this epoch of globalisation, 
the emergence of the three macro-regions for capital accumulation has become 
apparent: the East Asian region centred on Japan and the rising economies of 
China, South Korea, and India; the North American region centred on the US; 
and the European region centred on the EU. Africa seems to be of no interest to 
the global system (see Oyeyinka 2003; Lall 2005). Latin America remains to be 
an economic laggard which ‘seems to be living in a distributional world of its 
own, acting as though it were on a different planet’— ven though its wealth and 
labour remain targets for exploitation (see Palma 2003; also Lall et al. 2004). 
Moreover, the international private capital movements across the globe in the 
era of globalisation for the period 1980-1997 suggests increasing inequality in 
inter-country development—specifically, while there is improvement in the 
material conditions of the majority of developing economies, those located in 
Africa and South Asia have remained seriously disadvantaged (see Rasiah 
2000). Interestingly, even mainstream economists like Krugman finds that the 
wonders of technology are ‘not so wondrous’ at all as shown by recent 
economic data (see Krugman 1996) and that while the internet revolution props 
up growth it does not necessarily lead to stability (see Krugman 2001).
  
The widening of social divisions is resonated in ownership of and access to 
technology and finance. The widening gap is both a consequence of global 
inequalities arising from the capitalist international order, and in turn becomes 
reinforcing sources of its perpetuation. This is so because this is how technology 
is organised in a regime of capitalist market-led development: ‘Access to 
technology in the capitalist market demands access to capital’ (Freeman 2001: 
209).  Market is said to be the key factor in innovation. Technology, which is the 
material manifestation of innovation, is the end product of science. While 
science, especially in its conceiving stage of idea, is free, technology is 
commodified. Capitalism treats technology not as ‘power of knowledge 
objectified’, but as power of knowledge commodified. Innovation is thus 
mediated at every point by exchange (that is, by the market), and its self-
reproduction likewise depends on the market. 
 
As has been suggested above, the science behind the tec nology is by nature 
neutral; but the economic structure, to a large extnt, defines—but not uniquely 
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determines—its potentialities and propensities. Under conditions of capitalism, 
technical change creates diversity in unit costs within sectors. There is a 
tendency for capitalists to delay introducing new equipment to a particular 
industry to achieve the optimal trade-off between current operating costs and 
losses on capital value (Weeks 1999). For mature industrial capitalists, lack of 
knowledge of superior techniques is therefore not a fundamental problem, nor 
their lack of finance to acquire them. The problem is manifested in the enduring 
tension between the forces and relations of production. While technical change 
offers efficiency to produce commodities, techniques ultimately depend on 
capitalist rationality grounded on the iron law forprofit and expansion, either 
they are the ‘profit-maximisers’ of the neo-classical school or the ‘profit-
seekers’ of the evolutionary school. In a word, this logic of profitability 
somehow delays technological innovation. Of course, th re are risks involved in 
delaying innovations especially when new capital comes to play. This also 
means that the logic of profitability of businesspeo l , especially the MNCs that 
are seen today as the force of innovation, could make innovation sterile and 
uneven development prevalent.  As Reinert (2005) rightly argues, ‘From [a] 
businessman’s point of view the very simple explanatio  for the lack of 
investments in poor countries is the lack of profit pportunities’.  This capitalist 
rationality suggests the contradictory potential of technological innovation for 
poorer countries, and in particular the highly concentrated FDI needed for their 
development.  Pippa Norris (2000: 3) observes that ‘[t]he 29 OECD member 
states… contain 97 per cent of all internet hosts, 92 per cent of the market in 
production and consumption of computer hardware, software and services, and 
86 per cent of all internet users’. 
  
Further, the claim of Chris Freeman and Carlota Perez (1988) that the new 
techno-economic paradigm offers a wide-ranging scope of diversity, and hence 
opening ‘windows of opportunity’, while rational and valid, appears to be 
illusory at this historical moment globally dominated by market imperatives and 
global standardisation that are enforced and compelled at the local, regional, and 
global scales. This also means that the promise of increasing returns on the 
process and practice of innovation is likewise dependent on the market.  For 
instance, the controversial issue on intellectual property rights globally enforced 
through the creation of the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
Agreement has become an instrument of the developed countries in maintaining 
the status quo where they remain the dominant, and the poor countries in 
perpetual subordination. TRIPS has become the legalicense (and a reflection of 
double-standard as well) of the developed countries in ‘pulling up the ladder’ by 
protecting their private intellectual property regimes, and hence depriving the 
poorer countries of the space to catch up with development and the development 
strategy they were once pursuing when they were still ca ching up (see Chang 
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2002, 2003). This resonates the relentless drive for capital accumulation, rather 
than for assimilation, under global capitalism.  
 
The progressive potential of technology and innovati n but is actually resulting 
in a regressive reality of uneven development is worsened by the systematic 
exclusion of most actors in the society in the system of innovation, in particular 
the workers who comprise majority of the population and without whom the 
system cannot work. Production is realised through a prior exercise of human 
imagination: human desires, purposes, and intentions are mobilised towards an 
end. Under industrial capitalism, however, not everyone has access to this 
process but a few; hence, the mass population is denie  access to the full play of 
human creativity, subjecting them into an alienating situation  (Harvey 1992). 
This traditional understanding on social exclusion vis-à-vis the process of 
innovation may not be absolutely valid today. But it may also be true that there 
still exists this kind of exclusion in some industries or firms where only a select 
few do the imagining and designing, and make all the decisions and set up 
technologies that regulate the actions of workers. Moreover, workers today may 
have been included in the process of innovation but they are excluded in 
enjoying the fruits of innovation. The 1995 World Development Report 
recognises this tragic reality of rising unemployment and poor labour conditions 
existing at a time of rapid growth in average levels of productivity per worker 
and a rapid growth in world trade amidst reductions in costs of movement, 
increasing trade liberalisation, and rising international flows of investments in 
the form of transnationally integrated production systems (see also Singh and 
Zammit 2000).      
 
This reality of the market-dependent and socially disembedded nature of 
innovation under conditions of capitalism contradicts one of the main 
assumptions of neo-classical economics of the universal access to the means of 
innovation and the existence of perfect competition. Paul Samuelson’s (1948, 
1949, 1953) factor-price equalisation theorem, which remains to be a dominant 
discourse in economic integration influencing policy formulations worldwide, 
posits that free trade among countries would result in equality in prices paid to 
the factors of production, namely capital and labour, all over the world. Its 
essential assumptions include: (a) that all countries have access to the same 
technology of production, (b) that output results from capital and labour, which 
can be substituted for each other in the production process; (c) that demand 
structure in the domestic economy in each country is the same; (d) that changes 
in wage rates as well as profit rates are not affected by the measures of the 
‘factor-intensity’ of a product, and (e) that domestic markets are perfectly 
competitive. However, the falsity of each of these assumptions has been 
empirically and apparently proven over the years, specifically the assumptions 
of equality and perfect competition (see Weeks 1999; Reinert 1994, 2003). First, 
 10
the economic policies being pressed on by global capitalist institutions and 
developed economies to developing countries ‘fail to address the fundamental 
blind spots of neo-classical economics’, blind spot that prevent poor countries 
to develop (Reinert 2005): 
  
a) its [neo-classical economics] inability to register qualitative 
differences, including the different potentials of economic activities as 
carriers of economic growth, 
b) its inability to register synergies and linkages, and
c) its inability to cope with innovations and novelties, and how 
differently these are distributed among economic activities. 
 
Second, the factor-price equalisation theorem has tremendous implications for 
labour who comprise majority of the world’s population. Its inner rationality is 
that it is rational for wages to fall in the technologically developed countries 
(where wages are higher because labour is relatively less abundant). It also 
follows that it is irrational for labour to resist wage cuts (Carchedi 2001: 36-59). 
It thus gives intellectual justification to the hegemony of technologically leading 
countries, both in technologically advanced sectors and in decreasing wages.  
 
The universality of market imperatives, and their concomitant contradictions, 
intensified in the current ICT techno-economic paradigm does not lead to the 
reproduction of high-tech societies across the world, but rather to the 
reproduction of the ‘social antagonisms that spring from the natural laws of 
capitalist production’. This process of combined anu even development means 
that the logic of class struggle is increasingly global in character.  Accordingly, 
this is contrary to the assertion of Manuel Castell (1996-1998, 2000) that 
today’s dominant mode of production referred to as ‘informational capitalism’, 
which is characterised by the tremendous annihilation of space through time, is 
leading to the demise of class inequalities. Castells’ obsession with the rise of 
network society in which the ‘space of flows’ is annihilated through ‘timeless 
time’ glosses over the contradiction of the market-d pendent nature of 
innovation. Since capital is dependent upon the market for its self-reproduction 
and survival, the market thus compels it to drive for innovation while at the 
same time obstructing its own development. As Marx (1971: 50) puts it: 
 
The real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself. It is that capital and 
its self-expansion appear as the starting and the closing point, the motive and 
the purpose of production; that production is only production for capital and 
not vice versa, the means of production are not mere means for the constant 
expansion of the living process of the society of producers…. The means – 
unconditional development of the productive forces of society – comes 
continually into conflict with the limited purpose, the self-expansion of 
existing capital. 
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Competitiveness for Capitalist Market Competition 
Any development project is always for someone and for some purpose. Hence, it 
is a worthwhile endeavour to unpack the logic behind, and within which, the 
hegemonic discourse on competitiveness project is be ng pressed on national 
economies around the world by the multilateral, inter ational, and regional 
institutions, and is being implemented by states. 
 
The idea of national competitiveness has become a ky theme in assessing a 
country’s economic performance. The concept of competitiveness has been 
evolving over time. It has become a highly contested concept; corrupted, abused, 
and misused (see Reinert 1994; Lall 2001a, 2001b). In fact, the hyperactivity on 
it has elicited debates among economists and policy-makers as to its meaning 
and usefulness. Paul Krugman (1994), a popular mainstream economist, has 
warned of the dangers of the ‘obsession’ to competitiv ness, and has argued that 
competitiveness is a meaningless concept. What matters, Krugman argues, is 
optimal allocation of resources, and hence the analytic  focus must be on 
‘productivity’. This has provoked a response from the camp of Stephen Cohen 
(1994) who argued for the analytical utility of said concept especially for 
comparative purposes among economies themselves. The late Sanjaya Lall 
(2001a, 2001b) also argued that there is a case for ‘competitiveness analysis’ in 
the real world that focuses on ‘imperfect competition, external economies or 
both’, as opposed to Krugman’s ‘growth analysis’. Erik Reinert (1994) likewise 
argues for the importance of the concept of competitiv ness in understanding 
national and global distribution of wealth.  Proposing a Schumpeterian 
understanding of competitiveness which is compatible with that of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as an 
economic policy that raises living standards, Reinert argues that the key element 
behind competitiveness—divorced from productivity and efficiency—is the 
pursuit of ‘dynamic imperfect competition’, which is an anti-thesis to the neo-
classical assumption of perfect competition that renders the concept of 
competitiveness meaningless. 
 
Amidst this series of discourse among economists, the concern on 
competitiveness from policy-makers and influential multilateral organisations 
and international financial institutions is real, and is currently exercised and 
enforced. Perhaps, the most cited and widely-accepted definition of 
competitiveness is from the OECD: ‘the degree to which a country can, under 
free and fair market conditions, produce goods and services which meet the test 
of international markets, while simultaneously maint i ing and expanding the 
real incomes of its people over the long term’ (Garelli 2003). Stéphane Garelli, 
the Director of the World Competitiveness Project 2003, makes a case that 
nations compete to ‘increase their standard of living’. However, this appears to 
be a normative stance on the issue of competitiveness, which is insensitive to 
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today’s reality economics and bereft of a consciousnes  of the capitalist ethic of 
profitability and of the structural logic of contemporary global capitalism. First, 
the competitiveness agenda of international financial institutions for the 
developing regions of Latin America and Asia stresses labour market reform—
hence, the creation of a ‘flexible’ labour force and the imperative of labour 
productivity—as a key strategy to the establishment of competition cultures and 
the promotion of competitiveness.2 Second, competitiveness underlies the 
political-economic logic of capitalism in general and of free capital mobility in 
particular. 
 
IDB and ADB: Labour Productivity as an Essential Element in Competitiveness 
Contemporary economic reality—and to a large extent the business ethic itself—
tells us that labour productivity is essential to competitiveness. This is explicit, 
and straightforward, from the influential multilateral institutions that are staunch 
proponents of competitiveness themselves such as the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) for the Latin American region and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) for the Asian region.  The IDB has switched its 
advocacy ‘from the extraction of absolute surplus value to relative surplus 
value’ (Cammack 2004: 262): 
 
No productive sector can expect its competitiveness to be based on 
diminishing the well being of its workers. Even in the most labor-intensive 
sectors, the possibility of competing and expanding epends not on workers’ 
salaries but on unit labor cost; that is to say, on the combination of the 
effective cost per worker and the productivity of labor. (IDB 2001: 4) 
 
The ADB’s competitiveness report in the 2003 Asian Development Outlook is 
clear-cut on labour productivity as constitutive of c mpetitiveness:  
 
[N]ational competitiveness has become something of a buzzword: in common 
parlance, competitiveness is used to cover almost any aspect of market 
performance and its overuse may detract from its importance. In fact, the key 
variable for the economic analysis of competitiveness is the growth of labor 
productivity since this, ultimately, is the main determinant in raising living 
standards. This is what competitiveness is about. (ADB 2003: 206) 
 
ADB’s understanding of competitiveness is totally different from that of the 
OECD’s raising living standard rhetoric and that of Reinert’s conception that is 
‘devoid from issues of productivity and efficiency’. The ADB’s strategy in the 
                                                      
2  It must be asserted that what is being presented here is the project of competitiveness 
from the point of view of the powerful international financial institutions. A critical 
political economy perspective, before it provides a critique on the status quo and an 
alternative to it, tries to see the world from the point of view of business, from the point 
of view of the forces of capital. 
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institutionalisation of competition culture (through increasing firm-level 
productivity and the provision of necessary institutional support) on the 
catching-up states of Asia is bold and daring, statements that could have actually 
come directly from Marx’s Capital that is a critique of the political economy of 
capitalism: 
 
Why does raising firm-level labor productivity matter? Because this is how 
the profit motive is put into practice at that level. In order to increase profits, 
firms must increase labor productivity, and it is for this purpose that new 
machines and methods of production are introduced, lea ing to an increase in 
the capital/labor ratio. Increasing labor productivity is the key to ensuring 
survival and long-run growth both at the firm and national levels, and this is 
the essence of competitiveness. Figure 3.2 summarizes the two channels used 
by firms to increase labor productivity, i.e., technical and allocative 
efficiency, and technical progress. These two channels are, in practice, 
complementary and mutually reinforcing. (ADB, 2003: 215) 
 
WEF and IMD: A Capitalist Free Market-Oriented Competitiveness 
Reinforcing labour productivity as an essential strategy in building-up 
competitiveness is the free-market orientation underlying it. At present, there are 
two leading annual competitiveness indices in the world—namely, the Geneva-
based World Economic Forum (WEF) that publishes The Global 
Competitiveness Report, and the Lausanne-based International Institute for 
Management Development (IMD) that publishes The World Competitiveness 
Yearbook. These indices are too influential to policy-makers, analysts, and 
researchers around the world despite its methodological, measurement, and 
definitional flaws (see the rigorous and insightful evaluation by Lall 2001b). 
Their bias towards a capitalist, free market-oriented structure is straightforward. 
 
The ‘market friendly’ injunction for nations to be competitive that underlies 
these indices favours the assumption of the efficiency of the market. Take for 
example the IMD’s ‘The Golden Rules of Competitiveness’. There is little doubt 
as to the desirability of these rules especially on the emphasis on the 
preservation of the ‘social fabric by reducing wage disparity and strengthening 
the middle class’ (Garelli 2003: 709). These ‘Golden Rules’ are in fact the 
relatively impressive features of the high growth rates and the long-term socio-
economic stability during the ‘Golden Age’ (for an insightful discussion on the 
socio-economic features of the Golden Age, see Glyn et al. 1990; Patel 1992; 
Singh 1995).  However, a careful examination of ‘The Principles of World 
Competitiveness’ underlying these Golden Rules, the latt r would come out to 
be nothing but an empty rhetoric. The Principles underscore an open, export-led 
market in which ‘competition is governed by market forces’; a minimal 
government intervention to business activity; a skilled, productive labour force 
subordinated to the market imperatives to achieve business efficiency; and a 
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well-developed infrastructure and an efficient busine s system supportive of the 
market (see Garelli 2003: 710). These market-based Principles to which the 
Golden Rules are founded is far from realising the success of the Golden Age: a 
historical moment when a competitive economy with an industrial policy was 
characterised by a strong, co-ordinated, protected, an  efficient manufacturing 
sector able to satisfy ‘the demands of consumers at home at least cost [and] also 
able to sell enough of its products abroad to pay for the nation’s import 
requirements…[and to do so] at socially acceptable levels of output, 
employment, inflation, real wages and the exchange rate’ (Singh 1977: 128).   
 
What Pyke and Sengenberger (1992) refers to as the ‘high road’ to 
competitiveness that focuses on efficiency, innovati n, and good working 
condition is a must and indeed desirable.  However, th y also allude to the fact 
that innovation does not necessarily lead to the high road, there also exist the 
‘low road’ to competitiveness of ‘race to the bottom’, lowering wages and 
labour standards. Therefore, there is an urgent need and a crucial task to move 
beyond the normative and ethical ‘raising-living-standard’ assertions on 
competitiveness, and into the critical endeavour of analytical and logical rigour 
of contemporary reality economics. Rather than being contented and complacent 
on the normative take that ‘competitiveness should raise standards of living’, the 
critical question to ask is ‘what does a capitalist market-led competitiveness 
mean?’ The previous section has examined the contradictions of the market-led, 
as well as the market-dependent nature, of innovatin constitutive in the 
emergent competitiveness project vis-à-vis the current processes of economic 
globalisation, which emphasises free trade, free move ent of capital, and labour 
market flexibility within national economies. 
 
Under market-dependent nature of global capitalism of intensified competition, 
states and firms compete with one another, as well as cooperate, in order to 
increase the rate of profit and lower the cost of labour. This is the logical 
structure of competition in the accumulation of capital that Schumpeter’s 
normative take on competition in particular and capitalism in general could not 
grasp. For Schumpeter (1950: 68), competition is the driving force of 
innovation, and hence the lifeblood of the capitalis  system, that would, ‘by 
virtue of its mechanism’, progressively raise the living standard of the masses. 
On the contrary, the logic of competition is founded on higher levels of 
productivity (i.e., more output per unit labour). Competition has thus resulted in 
unemployment, and the flexibility of labour relations has led to lower cost of 
labour (for empirical studies, see Singh and Dhumale 2000; Singh and Zammit 
2000).  
 
Labour market reform—with the accompanying principles of labour 
productivity and ‘flexible’ labour force—is an essential strategy of 
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competitiveness constitutive of the process of capitalist technological 
innovation. It by no means revolutionises the existnce of the conditions of the 
workers. In this sense of promoting competitiveness under conditions of 
capitalist market competition, competitiveness would be inimical to innovation. 
Since production is immediately consumption, and vice versa, it follows that 
increasing purchasing power of the people is a vital requirement for the 
perpetuation of innovation. There is thus an urgent and critical need for the 
political economy of development to focus not only on the seemingly 
predictable productive capacity of technology (supply-side), but also on 
consumption patterns (demand-side). 
 
    
Conclusion, Recommendation, and Prospects for a ‘Wisdom Society’ 
This essay has tried to offer a preliminary take on the critical political economy 
approach to social innovation system, examining the dynamics of innovation 
and critiquing the logic of competitiveness under conditions of the enduring 
global capitalist structure. There are still many terrains to be explored in 
understanding the dynamics underlying innovation and o  its proper use for 
social development. This would include the concrete mechanisms and policy 
recommendations for the realisation of innovation system truly embedded in the 
society. The emergent trends at the firm-level of technology partnering and of 
clustering in this globalising learning economy (for example, Lundvall 2003; 
Pietrobelli 1996; Pietrobelli and Sverrisson 2003) are terrains needed to be 
further explored, and be tried to be captured within e critical political economy 
approach to social innovation system as these are contemporary realities not 
only in business and innovation, but in the rest of the society. This kind of 
analysis that incorporates firm-level dynamics with the social dimension is 
important simply because it touches on reality thatimplicates social relations, 
the real lives of human beings. The issues of learning, skills, competence 
building, and capabilities—including the building of technological capabilities 
and of learning capabilities—are some of the important issues that need to be 
further analysed through the lenses of critical political economy perspective that 
is more historically and structurally conscious, socially embedded, truly holistic, 
and critical of the capitalist system.   
 
In incorporating the logic of the capitalist system in understanding the dynamics 
of innovation and the contemporary project on competitiv ness for capitalist 
market competition, an important learning that can be drawn from this essay, 
learning that needs to be elevated into the level of consciousness, is that: the 
perpetuation of uneven development today is done by the capitalist and pro-
capitalist political forces by subjecting and subordinating the poor countries and 
the workers to the imperatives of the capitalist market in which the market is 
used as an end rather than a tool in attaining development. Therefore, the 
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greatest unconsummated development project of our time is to re-embed in the 
society the market forces that now control the world. 
 
With all its ideological mystifications, it is harder to reveal than to conceal the 
exploitative character of capitalist relations, or t  capture it in theory (Wood 
2001). This essay has risen up to this challenge in its attempt to unpack the 
realpolitik of the contemporary dominant discourse on innovatin and 
competitiveness as an economic and business strategy oriented towards free 
capital mobility, profit-maximisation, and labour market flexibility. It has tried 
to unpack the current dominant discourse on competitiveness against the 
background of the intensifying imperative for global competition that intends to 
impose capitalist market discipline to all economic agents and the universal 
geography. At the heart of this competitiveness project is labour market reform 
in which workers are directly subjected to the compulsions of the principles of 
labour productivity and ‘flexibility’. Indeed, the ongoing project with the 
rhetoric of competitiveness-as-economic-policy-raising-living-standard is 
perfectly captured by John Weeks (2001): ‘to globalise requires global lies’. 
 
There is a need for developing countries to pursue industrialisation which could 
address the issue of both production and redistribution, and usher in civilisation 
and long-term development to the Third World; in particular, a very strong and 
efficient manufacturing sector that is able to perpetually enhance its 
technological capability, and able to create local synergistic exchange between 
different economic activities in the urban and rural spaces (i.e., a synergy 
between activities in the manufacturing, agriculture, and advanced services), as 
well as possessing diverse economic base, a dynamic division of labour, and 
specialising in increasing returns activities. These industries should be situated 
within the framework of their respective social innovation systems that uphold 
the idea of the ‘social’ in attaining collective social developmental goals. In 
doing so, industrialisation will be able to create formal employment—as well as 
full employment—in which a critical mass and a countervailing power of labour 
unions are socially formed.   
  
An alternative national competitiveness strategy that is able to mount country-
specific industrial policy, characterised by co-ordinated institutions and an 
economy that harmonises productivity and real wage, is most urgently needed. 
Governments are not necessarily inefficient (Kiely 1998). While it is true that 
the developing world is structurally constrained by thehistorical imperatives of 
neo-liberalism, globalisation and technical change do not eliminate the need for 
intervention and the policy space for selective industrialisation (Lall 2003b; 
Archibugi and Pietrobelli 2002). After all, the state remains the point of 
concentration of the power of capital that implements and enforces the global 
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economy. Thus, it remains the most effective means in intervening in the global 
economy.   
  
Contrary to the mantra that ‘there is no alternative’ n the emergent hegemony of 
neo-liberal globalisation, states have some spaces to address their developmental 
concerns. The market is a blind force that needs the intervention of the state in a 
way that re-embeds the market forces in the society. It would thus be necessary 
to learn from the analysis of Schumpeter (1939) on business cycles, while not 
being complacent of the promises of innovation:    
 
Times of innovation…are times of effort and sacrifie, of work for the future, 
while the harvest comes after…. The harvest is gathered under recessive 
symptoms and with more anxiety than rejoicing…. [During] 
recession…much dead wood disappears. 
 
Indeed, innovation—with its concomitant logic of competition and its market-
dependent nature under conditions of capitalism—reinforces the existing market 
realities not only of digital divides, but of social divisions and of increasing 
material inequalities as well. The emergent knowledge economy must then be 
guided with wisdom (that is, a higher level of knowledge with ethical 
consideration and a high sense of social responsibility and solidarity). In this 
way, knowledge would not only be a question of who, what, why, and how; but 
also of ‘for whom’ with consideration on ‘what do we do to what we know?’. In 
particular, it highlights the concern on ‘knowledge for whom?’ and 
‘development for whom?’. The realisation of this ‘wisdom society’, as an 
alternative to the project of creating capitalist market-dependent ‘knowledge 
society’, would thus require a particular economic structure that is not just left to 
the pursuit of individual private interests; but an economy that is embedded in 
the society. 
 
The task of nurturing wisdom in particular and socio-economic change in 
general cannot be expected to come from the forces of the market. The 
oppressed, the marginalised, and the exploited are exp cted to resist and struggle 
against the market-led development of the capitalist sy tem, a terrain not simply 
of freedom and choice, but of coercion and dominatio . There are ‘real existing 
resistances’ that offer hope for structural change. Worthy of note is the Linux 
operating system introduced in the early 1990s by Linus Torvalds, a student 
from Finland. Since he placed the source code or the Linux kernel in the internet 
thousands of devoted programmers have contributed to its development (see 
Moody 2001). What motivated these programmers is not greed, the dream of 
becoming multimillionaires overnight but the desire to subvert the concept of 
proprietary programs. They believe that the power of computing should be 
accessible to all, and that one’s invention and innovation should be shared, and 
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others may contribute to its improvement. Associating nnovation with the 
market precludes Linux, for instance, from the title of being innovative, which 
the latter technically deserves. Linux has thus created a space in the computing 
world which Bill Gates and Steve Jobs cannot corner a d control.  
 
Social institutions such as progressive social moveents and the universities 
have a key role to play in the resistance against the system of private 
appropriation that carries no public responsibilities. They can be the ‘forces of 
wisdom’ that empower the masses and the students throug  critical thinking and 
learning. They could be a force for structural change, institutions not just for 
knowledge generation but also for the nurturing of wisdom, creating mass 
consciousness that the art and science of invention and innovation are social 
endeavours that implicate the society, and hence must carry public 
responsibilities (see Dutton 1999). Wisdom is the antidote to the 
commodification of knowledge. 
 
But the crucial task of resubordinating the market forces requires a much bolder 
and more daring political-economic development project. In this regard, an 
understanding of a multifaceted and multidimensional nature of the processes of 
historical change that is both dynamic and social would be indispensable, and of 
utmost significance for the true forces of development to take heart. This task 
may be large in scope, and indeed ambitious. But it meaningfully challenges the 
developmental forces to also struggle against the hegemony of the outmoded 
values and theories of capitalist market fundamentalism and neo-classical 
economics, alongside the building-up of local technological capabilities and the 
gradual institutionalisation of a strong manufacturing base specialising in 
increasing returns activities. Only an authentic so ial innovation system offers a 
viable alternative to the disembedding of the market forces from the society; and 
one that could tame the ‘animal spirit’, discipline th  ‘greedy, selfish baker’, and 
regulate the ‘gales of creative destruction’. 
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